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This article discusses conflicts of interest existing between investors and their financial advisors. 
Several contributions in this field treated this question in relation either with invested amount or with 
expected holding period of the mutual fund. Our paper considers an approach globalizing these two 
parameters. The first part describes the organization of mutual fund fees in the US. Thanks to a 
numerical simulation, the second part emphasizes the conflict of interest focusing on the expected 
holding period. The third one analyses the changes of variables and their consequences on 
characteristics of investors concerned by this conflict of interest.  
 
JEL classification : G23; G24; G28 




Cet article traite des conflits d’intérêts existant entre les investisseurs et leur conseiller financier. Des 
contributions antérieures ont apporté des éclairages sur cette question en considérant soit les montants 
investis soit l’horizon d’investissement des investisseurs. Cet article intègre ces différentes dimensions 
dans une approche globale. La première partie décrit le système des frais aux Etats-Unis. La seconde, 
grâce à une simulation numérique, met en évidence le conflit d’intérêt en se concentrant uniquement 
sur l’horizon d’investissement. La troisième partie traite des changements de variables et leurs 
conséquences sur les caractéristiques des investisseurs concernés par ce conflit d’intérêts.  
 
Classification JEL : G23; G24; G28 














































1.  Introduction  
 
The mutual fund industry in the United States has known a tremendous growth over the last 30 years. 
By 2009, half of American households held shares in one or several mutual funds (ICI 2010). 
Moreover 8,000 mutual funds manage 11,121 billion dollars in the United-States (ICI (2010)). This 
success has been supported by substantial marketing efforts and generous commission schemes to 
induce sales brokers.  
To purchase mutual fund shares indeed, investors can turn to many types of intermediaries and have 
choices as how to pay for their services. They may pay a “sales load” at the time they purchase shares, 
or a deferred sales load when they redeem shares, and/or they may have to pay annually 12b-1 fees 
that are deducted from the fund’s assets. Combined together, these fees entailed the creation of 
different share classes typically labeled class A, B and C shares. Investors make a choice between 
these share classes according to their characteristics in terms of invested amounts and expected 
holding period. However it may occur that the related compensation scheme of their financial advisor 
doesn’t match their particular needs. In doing so, the existence of this conflict of interest drove to 
numerous litigation cases (Senator et al (2006) and Krawczyk (2004).   
So what are the characteristics of investors exposing them to this conflict of interest? 
Are investors more or less exposed as determining parameters them to this conflict of interest vary?  
 
Most of studies explain this conflict of interest either with the Expect Holding period O’Neal (1999b), 
Livingston and O’Neal (1998), Davis (1995) or with the invested amounts Foster (2009), Senator et al 
2006, SEC 2004. The latter has been the most frequently treated especially because it entailed many 
litigation cases. Our approach integrates these two causes to explain this conflict of interest.  
 
To answer these questions, a preliminary part introduces an overview of mutual fund fees in the US.  
Thanks to numerical simulations in a second part, it is determined characteristics of investors 
concerned by a conflicting situation with their financial advisor. It is made the restrictive assumption 
that invested amounts are lower than $50,000. However, this assumption will be relaxed in the last 
part. In a third part, varying variables of the model, it is emphasized the evolution of these 
characteristics.  
   







































Investors willing to buy mutual fund shares do not all call for brokers’ services and it implies a 
different pricing structure. It is common practice to distinguish load from no-load mutual funds.  
Load funds use brokerage firms to distribute their shares or any other intermediary between them and 
investors. These intermediaries advise investors in order to guide their choices and to provide 
additional services
2. Investors care about these guidance and services and it justifies the payment of 
load fees.  
A no-load fund is a mutual fund whose shares are sold without a sales commission and with limited 
distribution fees
3. No-load funds adopt a more direct relationship with their clients in order to promote 
their shares. It relies on relatively cheaper distribution methods (advertisement, direct mails…).  
 
In doing so, non-sophisticated investors tend to invest in mutual funds with load fees,  under the 
influence of marketing and their brokers’ recommendations ICI (1997), Del Guercio (2002) whereas 
sophisticated investors choose no-load mutual funds. Thereafter this paper focuses on non-
sophisticated investors as it is considered conflicts of interests between investors and their brokers.  
According to their invested amount and their expected holding period, investors have to make a choice 
among different classes of shares which result from combinations of three types of fees. Three main 
share classes are usually mentioned and typically denoted by A, B, C as described in table 1 (Annex 
1):  
-  Class A shares charge front-end loads declining according to the level of the invested amount and 
12b-1 fees relatively lower in comparison to the other share classes. Class A shares are the only 
one to propose front-end loads. In addition to their profitable aspect, front-end loads induce 
investors to stay longer in the fund in order to amortize them. Compared to the Class B and C 
shares described hereafter, funds with Class A shares are more suitable for investors with a 
relatively longer expected holding period.  
-  Class B shares are an alternative to Class A shares for investors with a long-term investment 
horizon. They adopt a coercive approach to prevent from an early withdrawal of the investor. 
Instead of paying front-end loads, the investor pays deferred loads in case of redemption of shares. 
These deferred loads decrease with each year the share is held. Deferred loads decline to zero over 
7 years. Additionally 12b-1 fees for Class B and C shares are of the same order and then relatively 
higher to those applied to Class A shares. Class B shares are usually converted into Class A shares 
after the eighth year of investment to avoid that investors bear higher 12b-1 fees too long.  
-  Class C shares charge relatively higher 12b-1 fees. They also include deferred loads of 1 % if the 
investor redeems his or her shares within the first year and zero the subsequent years. Mutual 
                                                 
2 This advice includes the fund selection, the asset allocation of the investor’s portfolio and taxation. Services 
usually include the opening of an account, financial orientated press, an availability to answer to investors’ 
questions, an overview of the account by web…  







































funds using Class C Shares are also called “level load funds”. Considering the relative 
combinations of fees they use, Class C shares are particularly suitable for investors with a short 
term expected holding period. Moreover, they allow a more reactive management of the investor’s 
portfolio changing more frequently of mutual fund at a lower cost.  
 
3.  The conflict of interest analysis 
 
The conflict of interest results from the inadequacy between interests of the investor in terms of fees 
charged and the related compensation of the broker. In such a situation a broker may be induced to 
advise a class of share not suitable to an investor according to his or her characteristics in terms of 
expected holding period or invested amount. In doing so, what are the characteristics of investors 
concerned by conflicting situations with their financial advisor?  
In this part, it is only considered situations where invested amounts are lower than $50,000 to avoid 
any questions concerning discount policy and to isolate characteristics related to the expected holding 
period of the investor. Characteristics concerning the invested amount will be treated further. 
 
3.1. The model 
 
To demonstrate the conflict of interest, we compare
4 the annual Holding-Period Return (HPR) of 
investors with the Present Value Commission (PVC) of brokers for each share class. A numerical 
simulation is implemented and results are graphically represented. A first step consists in presenting 
formulas related to the annual Holding-Period Return and the Present Value Commission. Next 
simulations are applied according to different expected holding-period and then preferences of 
investors and brokers are compared.  
 
The annual holding-period return of investors (HPR) 
 
The Holding Period Return is the total net return of a mutual share over the period during which it was 
held. To compare this HPR between different investment horizons and between share classes we 
annualize the HPR to obtain a percentage per year. 
For each class of share, the related net expected annualized holding-period return is compared in order 
to estimate the most suitable share class according to the expected holding period of the investor. Each 
class A, B, C share has a specific combination of fees as described in Table 1 according to the 
corresponding formulas hereafter:  
                                                 
4 This approach comparing share classes has been used by Collins (2004), O’Neal (1999a and 1999b), 
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FLi denotes the front-end loads charged by the fund i, Rdaily stands for its daily expected returns and 
Edaily is the daily expense ratio
5. t is the holding period, in years.  
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       (2) 
For the Class B share, the formula takes into account the deferred loads (DL) for the corresponding 
year and the conversion into Class A share after z = 8 years.  
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The annual net Holding Period Return is graphically represented using figures appearing in Table 2. 
An average gross return of 12% per year has been assumed for this numerical simulation. The chart 
below displays the evolution of the annual Holding Period Return according to the expected holding 
period of investors for each share class.  
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Each point on one of these curves corresponds to a date at which an investor withdraws his or her 
money from a mutual fund. The corresponding coordinate on the Y axis is the average net return an 
investor could benefit each year until the date of withdrawal. Assuming an average gross return of 
12%, an investor that held a fund with a Class A share for 4 years can expect to obtain each year an 
average net return of 9.2%. 
                                                 
5 The daily expense ratio results from the annual expense ratio comprising 12b-1 fees and management fees 






































Because HPRA and HPRB are very similar, the comparison will mainly focus on HPRA and HPRC for 
the relevance of the analysis. The intersection point of HPRA and HPRC means that for the 
corresponding holding period, an investor is indifferent between having a Class A share and a Class C 
share. t*inv denotes this intersection point.  
Chart 1 shows that an investor with an investment horizon longer than t*inv = 7.9 years would prefer to 
acquire a Class A share. Conversely, an investor with a shorter investment horizon would prefer to 
have a Class C share.  
t*inv, the intersection point of HPRA and HPRC, is solution of the system:      
  * * , , inv inv t C t A HPR HPR =         ( 4 )    
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The Present Value Commission of brokers (PVC) 
 
Financial advisors are rewarded for getting a new client through two types of commissions:  
-  An initial sales commission (ICi) stemming from front-end loads and paid when the new client 
enters into the fund and  
-  A trailing sales commission (TCi) that is paid quarterly to the financial advisor as long as his or 
her client keeps his or her shares.  
As described in Table 1 the financial advisor’s earnings depend of the share class sold to the investor. 
The Present Value Commission represent the total compensation that the broker receives for the entire 
duration the investor keeps his or her shares.  
The trailing commission for the fund i (TCi) is paid to the broker on each quarter and deducted from 
12b-1 fees. TCi is computed on a daily basis n. Assuming that a quarter includes 63 working days, the 
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Then, the expression of the Present Value Commission can be written as the sum of the Initial 
Commission and the discounted Trailing Commissions. T is the whole length of time in quarters the 
investor holds his or her shares and k is the discount rate.  
Apart from front-end loads applied to the Class A share, the formula used to obtain the Present Value 
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The present Value Commission of brokers is graphically represented according to the expected 
holding-period of investors for each share class
6 as below. According to these equations and using 
figures in Table 1, we conduct a numerical simulation as shown in Table 2. Calculations are based on 
a gross annual return of 12% and a risk free rate of 3% has been applied to discount commissions of 
brokers.  
 














































































                                                 
6 Class A and B shares are also very similar from brokers’ point of view. It is then focused on the comparison 






































In this Chart, an intersection point is also noticeable between the Present Value Commissions related 
to classes A and C shares. This point is denoted by t*Brok representing the holding period for which 
brokers are indifferent between advising a class A share and a Class C share. t*Brok appears after 4.4 
years corresponding to a PVC of 6,21%. 
 
t*Brok is solution of the system











































γ      (9) 
 
Divergent / convergent interest areas and characteristics of investors   
 
Comparing the broker’s PVC with the investor’s HPR according to various investment horizons, the 
conflict of interest arises indeed.  
•  A broker could prefer to advise a Class C share to a long term investor, while a Class A share 
would be more suitable.  
•  A broker could prefer to advise a Class A share to a short term investor, while a Class C share 
would be more suitable.  
To be more precise a comparison of indifference points of investors and brokers reveals a potential 
conflict of interest but not for every expected holding period. It may be delimited areas of holding 
period with a conflict of interest and areas of holding period where interests of brokers and investors 
converge. 
Points of indifference t*inv and t*Brok between classes A and C shares are respectively set after 7.9 
years corresponding to a HPR of 10.11% and after 4.4 years corresponding to a PVC of 6.21%.   
Based on these key figures, these areas of divergent and convergent interests are shown in the Table 3.  
 
Table 3 : Conflict of interest between brokers and advisors 
  Area with a conflict 
of interest  
Area with 
convergent interests 




0                         t
*
Brok= 4.4 years                   t
*
inv= 7.9 years 
 
Brokers prefer to 
advise   A C  C 
Is preferable for 
Investors  C C  A 
                                                 
7 The existing conditions for the intersection point t
*







































For the period of time bounded by the segment [t*inv  ; t*Brok] interests of brokers ans nvestors 
converge. This area with convergent interests is spread over a period of t*inv – t*Brok =  3.5 years.  
In doing so, investors characterized by an expected holding period included in [t*inv ; t*Brok] are not 
concerned by this conflict of interest. Out of this area, investors are all concerned.  
As can be seen t*inv and t*Brok may vary with variables of the model. Therefore the convergent interest 
area is unstable and its dynamics should be analyzed.  
 
4.  Dynamics of the convergent interest area 
 
Assuming that investors are uniformly distributed according to their expected holding period, 
variations of the convergent interest area may give information about the proportion of investors 
concerned by the conflict of interests. This study may help whether to suggest solutions to enlarge the 
convergent interest area or to stress situations in which more or less investors are exposed to conflicts 
of interests.   
Convergent and divergent interest areas vary according to exogenous factors as the discount rate, 
expectations about the market trend, the specific return of a fund, the level of fees and commissions. It 
is then analyzed effects of these variations on the convergent interest area. The assumption of an 
invested amount lower than $50,000 will be relaxed at the end of this part.  
 
To keep consistency with the philosophy of share classes, the analysis of the conflict of interest 
respects the following assumptions:  
•  Let EA, EC, FLA, ICA, ICC, TCA, TCC, RA, RC  ≥  0  and  FLc = 0 
•  Let EA ≤ EC, ICA ≥ ICC and  TCA ≤ TCC. 
•  If t
*
inv >  t
*
brok or if t
*
brok >  t
*













brok, the convergent interest area disappears. To be 
consistent with the current conflict of interest, it is only studied the case where t
*









inv] and its maximal value tends to 
infinite. t
*




inv] and its minimal value is assumed to be zero.  
 
-  effect of a discount rate variation 
Proposition 1: a positive change of the preference for the present or the risk apprehension of brokers 
k decreases the convergent interest area. 
Proof 1: Because t
*






tinv . Since TCquaterlyC,m is 






































PVCC diminish but in a lower proportion for PVCA. Then t
*






tbrok . For any 




brok) < 0.  
 
Then, one can infer that brokers’ risk apprehension represented by an increase of k enlarges the 
conflict of interest areas at the expense of the convergent interest area. It entails that more unstable is 
the investment horizon of the client or more uncertain is the advisor’s professional situation and more 
the convergent interest area shrinks.  
Additionally, the conflict of interest disappears between brokers with a professional time horizon 
shorter than t*brok and investors with a long term horizon, because he or she will prefer to recommend 
Class A shares.  
 
-  effect of market trend expectations  
Proposition 2 : If market trend forecasts are optimistic, they imply a higher expected gross return and 
the convergent interest area increases. 
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TCquarterly,C is higher than TCquaterly,A and according to equation (7), an identical rise of RdailyA and 
Rdaily,C will imply a higher increase of the slope for PVCC than for PVCA. t
*












brok) > 0.  
So, optimistic market trend forecasts do not only imply an additional demand for mutual funds 
(Karceski (2002)) but they also imply an enlargement of the convergent interest area. The corollary is 
that pessimistic market trend forecasts decrease the convergent interest area. Nevertheless, this 
potential increase of the conflict of interest area is “compensated” by the decrease of the demand that 
characterizes an expected bear market period.    
 
-  effect of a variation of fees and commissions  
Effect of a FLA increase   
Proposition 3 : If FLA increases the convergent interest area increases. 
Proof 3: equation (5) shows that any increase of FLA implies that  –ln(1 – FLA) raises and then t
*
inv 






































diminishes. It entails a reduction of t
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increase of FLA,  0 ) (
* * > − ∆ brok inv t t  
 
Effect of a daily expense ratio  increase
8  
Proposition 4: An increase of the daily expense ratio of the class A or an increase of the daily expense 
ratio of the Class C share increase or reduces the convergent interest area, respectively.  











C daily C daily







ln 250 being lower than 1, if Edaily,A or Edaily,C increase, 
according to equation (5) t
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According to (6), for a positive variation of Edaily,A or Edaily,C, the slope of PVCA decreases or the slope 










































An increase of the daily expense ratio EA and/or front-end loads FLA implies an increase of the 
convergent interest area. From the conflict of interest perspective, one can say that an increase of Class 
A share fees has a virtuous effect
9, all other things being equal. On the contrary, an increase of fees 
related to Class C share entails a decrease of the convergent interest area. 
 
Effect of brokers’ commission increase 
Any variation of commissions has no impact on the net average return of investors. Therefore, it is 
only considered their effect on t*brok. 
Proposition 7: an increase of commissions from Class A shares or Class C shares decreases or 
increases the convergent interest area, respectively.  
Proof 7 : according to equation(8), an increase of ICA or ICC leads to a parallel upward shift of PVCA 
or PVCC  and t
*








































                                                 
8 It is reminded that Edaily,i is the daily expense ratio that includes “other expenses” and 12b-1 fees.  






































According to equation (7) an increase of TCA or an increase of TCC entails a steeper PVCA curve or a 








































In doing so, considering proposition (6) and reminding that 12b-1 fees are included in the daily 
expense ratio Ei, if an increase of brokers’ commissions is funded by an increase of fees in the same 
proportion, the effect on the convergent interest area is cancelled.   
 
-  Evolution of the conflict of interest according to invested amounts 
 
The delimitation of these conflict of interest areas has been done assuming that invested amounts are 
lower than $50,000. Nevertheless, depending on the importance of the amount invested, Class A 
shares offer discounted loads. It is then examined if investors with larger amounts will be more or less 
exposed to the conflict of interest. It is applied to front-end loads the sliding scale according to the 
invested amount and breakpoints as described in Table 1. 
Additionally, while it is observed the evolution of the convergent interest area for class A and C 
shares, it is included the Class B share.   
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As a result of a numerical simulation, this chart shows the evolution of indifference points between 
class A and C shares and the conflict of interest according to invested amounts. The dotted line 






































decreases to equal zero for amounts exceeding 1 million dollars. Surprisingly, investors with the 
largest amounts are also the most concerned by this conflict of interest. In other words, it is shown that 
the most important clients are and the most they are exposed to the conflict of interest with their 
financial advisor.  
However, if the invested amount is higher than the breakpoint $100,000 class A shares offer a discount 
to investors. For this level of invested amount, investors with a shorter expected holding period prefer 
to buy Class A Shares. On the other hand, brokers prefer advising a Class B Share to have higher 
commissions
10. Hereafter, it is shown the evolution of points of indifference  
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From $50,000, brokers are indifferent between class A and B share and from $100,000 they 
systematically are more rewarded when they sell a class B share rather than selling a class A share.  
From this breakpoint, higher invested amount are and narrower is the convergent interest area. 
Additionally, including Class B Share, the convergent interest disappears for lower invested amount 
$500,000 in our example).  
This last diagram stresses that investors the most exposed to the conflict of interest exposure are those 
with the largest amounts. This conclusion takes into account a comparison between class A, B and C 
shares and explains the conflict of interest with the expected holding period and the invested amount.   
                                                 
10 However the SEC have prohibited this type of practice mentioning it into an amendment of the Rule 12b-1 in 
2004. Securities and Exchange Commission [2004] « Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to 







































5.  Conclusion 
 
It has been demonstrated the existence of a conflict of interest between investors and their financial 
advisor. To be concerned by these potentially conflicting situations, we have determined 
characteristics of investors in terms of expected holding period for their mutual fund shares and 
invested amount.  
Isolating investors with an invested amount lower than $50,000 , it has been stressed with numerical 
simulations the existence of a convergent interest area and areas of conflict of interest according to 
their expected holding period. For these amounts lower than $50,000 it has been focused on a 
comparison between Class A and C shares. Varying variables of the model, we show that 
characteristics of investors exposed to the conflict of interest change.  
Any increase of market trend expectations or Front end loads or daily expense ratio of class A share 
implies an increase of the convergent interest area.  
An increase of the discount rate of brokers or daily expense ratio of Class C share shrinks the 
convergent interest area.  
Integrating invested amounts and comparisons with class B shares, it appears that the convergent 
interest area shrinks for amounts higher than $100,000 and disappears for amounts higher than 
$500,000. From this breakpoint, any kind of investor is exposed to a potential conflict of interest with 
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Annex 1  
Table 1  
 
Typical Class structures for Load Mutual Funds 
 
   Typical class structure for Load Mutual Fund   Broker compensation 
arrangement 













< $50,000   5.75% 5% 
$50,000 - $100,000   4.50% 4% 
$100,000 - $250,000  3.50% 3.20% 
$250,000 -$500,000  2.50% 2.25% 
$500 000- $1,000,000  2% 1.70% 
A  0.25% 0.70%  0% 
>1 000 000$  0%  1% 
0.25% 




3% the 3rd year
3% the 4th year 
2% the 5th year
B  1% 0,70% 
1% the 6th year
0%                       
Conversion into Class A 
share after the 8th year of 
investment. 
4% 0.25% 
1% the first 
year  C  1% 0.70% 
0% after the first 
year 
0% 1%  1% 
Cf: O'Neal E. S. [1999];"Mutual fund share classes and conflict of interest between brokers and 
investors"; Working paper; 1999 
O’Neal provides his article with data obtained from an average sample composed of 20 equity mutual 
funds among the largest.  
 
12b-1 fees are an annual marketing or distribution fee on a mutual fund. They are paid every year as 
long as the investor holds his or her shares.  
 
Deferred loads : also known as a back-end sales charge, they are imposed when an investor redeems 







































Other expenses: annual fees non related to distribution expenses.  
 
Front-end loads are sales charge applied at the time of the initial purchase for a mutual fund. It is 







Table 2  
Numerical simulations of investor Annual Holding-Period Returns and Broker Present 
Value Commissions  
 
Annual Holding-Period Return Present Value Commission   Investment Duration in 
years  HPRA,t HPRB,t HPRC,t PVCA,t PVCB,t PVCC,t 
0  0% 0%  0%  5,00%  4,00%  1,00%
1  4.56% 5.11%  9.11%  5,25% 4,26% 2,03%
2  7.70% 8.28% 10.11%  5,51% 4,54% 3,14%
3  8.77% 9.28% 10.11%  5,80% 4,83% 4,32%
4  9.31% 9.55% 10.11%  6,10% 5,15% 5,59%
5  9.63% 9.84% 10.11%  6,43% 5,49% 6,95%
6  9.85% 10.01% 10.11%  6,79% 5,86% 8,39%
7  10.01% 10.11%  10.11%  7,18% 6,24% 9,95%
8  10.12% 10.11%  10.11%  7,59% 6,69%  11,60%
9  10.21% 10.20%  10.11%  8,04% 7,16%  13,38%
10  10.29% 10.28%  10.11%  8,52% 7,67%  15,28%
11  10.35% 10.34%  10.11%  9,04% 8,22%  17,31%
12  10.39% 10.39%  10.11%  9,60% 8,82%  19,48%
13  10.44% 10.43%  10.11%  10,21% 9,46%  21,81%
14  10.47% 10.47%  10.11%  10,86% 10,15% 24,30%
15  10.50% 10.50%  10.11%  11,56% 10,90% 26,96%
16  10.53% 10.53%  10.11%  12,32% 11,70% 29,81%
17  10.56% 10.55%  10.11%  13,14% 12,57% 32,85%
18  10.58% 10.57%  10.11%  14,02% 13,50% 36,11%
19  10.60% 10.59%  10.11%  14,96% 14,51% 39,60%
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